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ROCK PERFORMERS AND THE "JOHN DOE"
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER:
DRESSING DOWN THE T-SHIRT PIRATES
There is a rock concert tonight. The show is a sell-out, and the promoters are happy. Not only were the ticket sales profitable, but a
large crowd means high volume sales of souvenirs, particularlyTshirts emblazoned with the performers' names or logos. In a few
hours, the fans will start arriving,filling the parking lots with their
cars and the coffers with their money. With the fans will come the
bootleggers.
Rock music is big business. Fans spend millions of dollars
every year for records and tickets to live performances. 1 With
great popularity comes great opportunity for the entertainers to
cash in on souvenirs bearing the name or logo of the group or
the likenesses of the performers. 2 With the merchandising opportunity come increasing problems with infringement of the
performers' property rights in their names, likenesses, logos,
and other designs closely associated with them. 3 Ordinarily,
performers license a promoter to produce and market such merchandise in return for royalties. 4 The arrangement is profitable
for both sides, and it also allows the performers to retain control
over the quality, design, and type of merchandise without the
burdens of day-to-day supervision. The smell of money, howin the profits without
ever, also attracts those who wish to share
5
paying royalties. Enter the bootleggers.
The quality of bootleg merchandise is generally inferior to
that of licensed goods, but often the counterfeit goods are priced
the same as, or only slightly less than, the real things. 6 Bootleg1. PEOPLE, December 28, 1981, at 74. During a three-month, 46-concert
tour of the United States in the fall of 1981, the Rolling Stones attracted over
two million concert-goers and grossed $35,000,000 in gate receipts. In New
York, fans paid scalpers up to $250 for $15 seats.
2. Id. The licensee sold over $5,000,000 worth of T-shirts in the first two
weeks.
3. 68 A.B.A.J. 30 (1982).
4. See, e.g., Springsteen v. Creative Screen Design, Ltd., No. 80 C 5389,
slip op. at 9 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 23, 1981) (licensee had exclusive right to use logo
on upper-body garments).
5. The term "bootlegger" arose during Prohibition, when illegal liquor
was concealed in the boot of the possessor. The courts and the plaintiffs
use the term here to denote those who market trademarked merchandise
without a license to do so.
6. Winterland Concessions Co. v. Sileo, 528 F. Supp. 1201, 1208 (N.D. Inl.
1981) (licensee sold T-shirts for eight to nine dollars, jerseys for twelve to
thirteen; bootlegger prices were not stated). See also Winterland Conces-
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gers may also use trademarks in ways to which the owner would
object.7 Capitalizing on both the popularity of a performer and

the T-shirt craze, many bootleggers concentrate on selling counterfeit T-shirts. The trademark logos of rock performers are silkscreened on thin, untreated cotton shirts which are sold outside
performance halls on concert nights. 8 The losses to the performers, the licensees, and the concert hall (all of whom share in the
profits) are staggering.9
While some forms of infringement are fairly easy to halt, the
sale of parking-lot T-shirts is peculiarly difficult to control. Nationally-known performers frequently have a pack of itinerant
vendors which follows them from city to city. 10 These vendors
are unlikely to remain in a city to appear at a formal hearing
and, like the local bootleggers who show up at every concert in a
given town, they give a false name when they are served or arrested." Trademark owners have no way to serve summons for
further litigation. They may obtain either a preliminary or persions Co. v. Creative Screen Design, Ltd., No. 80 C 5389 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16,
1981) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (licensee sold T-shirts
for eight dollars, jerseys for eleven; bootleggers sold T-shirts for five dollars,
jerseys for seven).
7. See, e.g., Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema,
Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979) (injunction sought against showing of the
pornographic film "Debbie Does Dallas"); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders,
Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir. 1979) (defendant marketed poster of semi-nude women wearing costumes markedly similar to
plaintiff's uniforms); Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183,
175 U.S.P.Q. 56 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (defendant used plaintiffs distinctive lettering on a poster urging "Enjoy Cocaine"); Girl Scouts v. Personality Posters
Mfg. Co., 304 F. Supp. 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (defendant published poster depicting a pregnant Girl Scout with the slogan "Be Prepared").
8. Winterland Concessions Co. v. Sileo, 528 F. Supp. 1201, 1208 (N.D. Ill.
1981) (defendants printed counterfeit T-shirts at own plant and sold them at
concerts around the country).
9. Gross sales over a three-day engagement may exceed $200,000. Id.
at 1207-08; 68 A.B.A.J. 30 (1982). In Sileo, the plaintiff's sales for the previous
twelve months were about $15,000,000, ninety percent of which were from
concert sales. Sixty-five percent of the proceeds from concert sales were
from T-shirts. Plaintiff licensee paid about $3,000,000 in royalties to co-plaintiff performers and another $3,000,000 to the concert halls. An attorney for
Winterland Concessions estimated that his client lost a sale to the outside
vendors for every sale made inside. 68 A.B.A.J. 30 (1982). One judge was
more conservative, calculating damages at a sales ratio of two sales inside
to one outside. Winterland Concessions Co. v. Creative Screen Design, Ltd.,
No. 80 C 5389 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 1981) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library,
Dist file).
10. Winterland Concessions Co. v. Sileo, 528 F. Supp. 1201, 1208 (N.D. Ill.
1981). Itinerant vendors are frequently hired by a printer-supplier to follow
the groups. Winterland Concessions Co. v. Creative Screen Design, Ltd.,
No. 80 C 5389 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 1981) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library,
Dist file).
11. Interview with Peter Wilkes, U.S. Marshall for the Northern District
of Illinoisi in Chicago (Jan. 29, 1982).
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manent injunction 12 without a named defendant, but enforcement of such an injunction is a problem. When the identity of
an offender is finally discovered, he can plead lack of notice and
hearing. Even if the trademark owner is able to determine a
bootlegger's real name, the offender is likely either to disregard
a court order or to act in direct opposition to it. 1 3 Plaintiffs are
4
caught in a dilemma. They have protectable property rights'
which are being injured by the actions of the bootleg merchants,
but the ordinary means of protecting those rights, a lawsuit, is
not available.
STATE PROTECTION OF TRADEMARKS

Because trademark protection is not expressly assigned to
Congress, as are patent and copyright protection, 15 all fifty
states allow registration of trademarks at the state level. 16 Performers could register their marks in each state and acquire a
state cause of action for infringement, but that would require
numerous filings and is therefore somewhat impractical. In
some jurisdictions, common-law trademarks are also recognized
12. A permanent injunction is particularly effective because it allows

the plaintiff to obtain search warrants, but the plaintiff still has to know who
and where to search. Winterland Concessions Co. v. Various John Does,
No. 80 Civ. 5165 ADS (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 1980) (order to show cause and
affidavits in support of plaintiff's application for temporary restraining order, order of seizure and preliminary injunction); Winterland Concessions
Co. v. Various John Does, No. 975 (Phila. C.P. Aug. 13, 1980) (permanent
injunction and order of disposition); Winterland Concessions Co. v. Various
John Does, No. C-331181 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 4, 1980) (preliminary injunction, order of disposition of seized merchandise). At least three federal
courts have issued permanent injunctions which cover not a single event,
but any musical events at a given arena, with some restrictions. Variety,
Aug. 18, 1982, at 69, col. 2.
13. Musidor, B.V. v. Great American Screen, 658 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1981)
(while under a preliminary injunction, defendant hid silk-screens in the
basement by day and silk-screened T-shirts by night); Winterland Concessions Co. v. Creative Screen Designs, Ltd., 210 U.S.P.Q 6 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (defendant was required to produce all means of production and records of

sale; some were produced, others were recovered by a private investigator

who picked through defendant's trash).

14. Most actions are brought under trademark law and the right of publicity. Copyrighted items such as album covers are sometimes copied, but
the copyright owner is usually the record company, not the performer.
Bringing the copyright owner into the suit takes time, and time is at a premium. Letter from Harold E. Wurst, Nilsson, Robbins, Dalgarn, Berliner,
Carson & Wurst to Cheryl Johnson (March 17, 1982).
15. Trade-mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879) (trade-mark arises implicitly
from the commerce clause; copyright and patent are explicitly created in
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
16. 2 J. GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 10.12 (5th ed.
1979). Most statutes make registration a prerequisite to enforcement of
property rights.
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and protected, and performers can use that protection in chal17
lenging infringers.
Aside from any property interest the performers may have
in registered or common-law trademarks, they also have legally
protected rights in good willl8 and the right of publicity. 19 Good
will is the perception by the public of the trademark as an identifier of satisfactory goods. 20 Once a reputation as a source of
quality goods is established, the owner may suffer irreparable
harm from the sale of unauthorized, inferior goods which bear a
mark which, in the public's mind, identifies the trademark owner as the source. 21 To protect this right, plaintiffs may invoke
any available state laws concerning unfair competition, decep22
tive trade practices, and fraud.
The right of publicity began as "appropriation," one of the
four divisions of the right of privacy as defined by Dean Prosser.23 In recent years, it has been recognized as a concept separate from the right of privacy and opposite in effect.24 The right

of privacy involves control of one's private life; the right of publicity involves control of one's public life. First articulated by
17. E.g., "Nothing herein shall adversely affect the rights or the enforcement of rights in trademarks acquired in good faith at any time at common
law." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 78 § 33 (West 1981). Other states have laws
which state the Oklahoma statute verbatim or have only minor wording differences, e.g., "marks" instead of "trademarks." 1981 CAL. STAT. § 14210;
COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-70-113 (1973); FLA. STAT. § 495.161 (1981); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 140, § 14 (1981); MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 102 (1978); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 417.066 (Vernon 1981).
18. Franklin Mint, Inc. v. Franklin Mint, Ltd., 331 F. Supp. 827 (E.D. Pa.
1971) (English firm used name confusingly similar to that of plaintiff in order to take advantage of plaintiff's reputation); Chips 'N Twigs, Inc. v. Blue
Jeans Corp., 146 F. Supp. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1956) (manufacturer of inferior boys'
clothing used name deceptively similar to plaintiff's trade name).
19. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977)
(defendant broadcast plaintiff's "human cannonball" act in its entirety
without permission or compensation); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579
F.2d 215 (1978) (defendant printed an Elvis Presley poster after Presley's
death, without permission of estate or licensee).
20. "Good will is that which makes tomorrow's business more than an
accident. It is the reasonable expectation of future patronage based on past
satisfactory dealings." E. ROGERS, GOOD WILL, TRADEMARKS, AND UNFAIR
TRADING 19 (1914).
21. Chips 'N Twigs, Inc. v. Blue Jeans Corp., 146 F. Supp. 246, 248 (E.D.
Pa. 1956) ("if ... the newcomer can take advantage of good will built up by
the plaintiff ... and so confuse the public ... irreparable harm must result
to the plaintiff ... and to the good will built up at great expense").
22. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121-1/2, §§ 311-317 (1981) (deceptive
trade practices); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121-1/2, §§ 261-272 (1981) (deceptive
business practices). Plaintiffs may also plead common-law torts of unfair
competition, misappropriation, and violation of right of publicity. Complaint at 11-13, Moon Records v. Various Does, No. 81 C 907 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 20,
1981).
23. W. PROSSER, TORTS 804-07 (4th ed. 1971).
24. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573
(1977).
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the Second Circuit in Haelan Laboratories,Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.,25 the Ohio Supreme Court later described the
right of publicity as "personal control over commercial display
and exploitation of [the performer's] personality and the exercise of his talents. '26 A minority of courts still includes the right
of publicity within the right of privacy. 27 Both positions, however, recognize that a violation of the right of publicity is action28
able in tort.
Difficulty arises for those whose marks are registered with
neither the state nor the United States Patent and Trademark
Office. State courts tend to be unfriendly toward unregistered
marks,29 and performers seldom register their marks, often because their marks are unregistrable. 30 Performers prefer the
concurrent jurisdiction of federal courts for trademark claims,
be litigated in the federal courts under
and any state claims 3can
1
pendent jurisdiction.
PROTECTION OF TRADEMARKS UNDER THE LANHAM ACT

In trademark infringement suits, plaintiffs depend heavily
33
32
on federal legislation for both a cause of action and a remedy.
25. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
26. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 47 Ohio St. 2d 224, 351
N.E.2d 454 (TV station broadcast entire act of plaintiff human cannonball
without permission or compensation), rev'd, 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
27. Winterland Concessions Co. v. Sileo, 528 F. Supp. 1201, 1213 (N.D. Ill.
1981) ("One of the species of the right of privacy . . . is the right of
publicity.").
28. Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.
1953) ("[CJourts enforce a claim which has pecuniary worth. This right
might be called a 'right of publicity.' "; majority); Winterland Concessions
Co. v. Sileo, 528 F. Supp. 1201, 1213 (N.D. Ill. 1981) ("unauthorized and unprivileged printing ... constitutes a violation of the right of publicity..
minority).
29. Interview with Jane Shay Lynch, Gottlieb, Rackman & Reisman,
New York, in Chicago (Jan. 20, 1982).
30. Many performers use their own names, and such marks are unregistrable under 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(3) (1976) (primarily a surname). Others
use geographical names (Chicago, Styx), which are excluded under 15
U.S.C. § 1052(e) (2) (1976) (primarily geographically descriptive or misdescriptive), or common words (Rush, Journey, Heart). Those marks must
have acquired a secondary meaning before they can be. registered.
31.

"Pendent jurisdiction .

.

. exists whenever there is a [substantial

federal claim] and the relationship between that claim and the state claim
permits the conclusion that the entire action ... comprises but one constitutional 'case.'" United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). Jurisdiction is specifically granted in 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1976) ("The district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action asserting a claim of
unfair competition when joined with a substantial and related claim under
the... trade-mark laws.").
32. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1976). This section, commonly known as § 43(a) of
the Lanham Act, forbids false designation of origin and false descriptions.
33. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1976) (Remedies; infringement; innocent infringement by printers and publishers).
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Congress' power to recognize and protect trademarks arises
under the commerce clause 34 of the United States Constitution 35 and is codified in the Lanham Act. 36 The purposes of
trademarks, and the reasons for protecting them, are: 1) to enable consumers to accurately identify the source of the product
and to base purchasing decisions on past experience with that
supplier;3 7 and 2) to prevent deception of consumers by use of
misleading identification. 38 Unlike patents and copyrights, 39 a
trademark does not grant exclusive rights in a product, but only
gives the exclusive use of a word or symbol which identifies the
trademark owner as the source of the goods. 4° Because of the
very personal stake of the trademark owner in controlling his
own reputation, and because of the public interest in enabling
the consumer to accurately identify the source of the goods,
trademarks, unlike patents and copyrights, are not limited in
time, but remain in effect as long as the symbol is used in commerce.4 1 In general, any word, symbol, or design can be used as
a trademark, 42 unless the mark is merely descriptive, or primarily a surname. 43 Under the Lanham Act, made-up words and
fanciful names which give no indication of the kind of goods
they mark acquire immediate protection." Common words or
symbols which are descriptive of the product may become valid
trademarks if they "become distinctive of the applicant's goods
34. The Trade-mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
36. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1976).
37. 'Trademark infringement is a tort because it interferes with the

marketing process in which the consumer chooses goods by their trademarks." Diamond, The Public Interest and the Trademark System, 62 J. PAT.
OFF.

Soc'Y 528, 529 (1980).

38. "[Tio prevent fraud and deception in such commerce ...
U.S.C. § 1127 (1976).

"

15

39. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1976) (right to exclude others from making, using or
selling); 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976) (reproduce, distribute, perform publicly, prepare derivative works).

40. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (1976) ("registrant's exclusive right to use the
mark in commerce. .. ").
41. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1058-59 (1976).

Trademarks may be registered for
twenty years and renewed for additional periods of twenty years each as
long as the mark is still in use in commerce or nonuse is excused by special

circumstances. The mark must be used in commerce that is subject to regulation by Congress.
42. Exceptions are immoral or slanderous matter, flags or coats-of-arms
of any city, state, or nation, the name, signature, or portrait of individuals or
former presidents who are survived by a widow, and marks confusingly

similar to marks already in use. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a)-(d) (1976).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (1976).
44. E.g., Kodak, Polaroid.
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in commerce. '45 While the language of the Lanham Act deals
specifically with registered marks, courts have repeatedly held
that the causes of action which arise under section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act are also available to the owners of unregistered
marks.Y
Infringement of trademark has two negative effects: 1) the
consumer may be deceived into buying unacceptable goods; and
2) the reputation of the trademark owner may be damaged or,
47
even if undamaged, is no longer under the owner's control.
The standard for trademark infringement is not actual confusion, but the likelihood of confusion in the minds of consumers
as to the source of the goods.48 Likelihood of confusion may be
found under either of two tests: physical similarity or secondary
meaning. If the infringing mark is so similar in shape, 49 meaning,5 0 design, 51 or sound 52 to the valid mark as to be confusing to
45. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1976). See, e.g., Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell,
Inc., 632 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1980) (cloth tab sewn into seam of right rear pocket had acquired a secondary meaning).
46. See, e.g., L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649 (3d
Cir. 1954) (defendant used picture of plaintiffs dress in advertising for similar dress of inferior quality); Winterland Concessions Co. v. Creative
Screen Design, Ltd., 210 U.S.P.Q. 6 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (unregistered trademarks
of rock musicians used on bootleg T-shirts); General Pool Corp. v. Hallmark
Pool Corp., 259 F. Supp. 383 (N.D. Ill. 1966) (defendant used picture of plaintiff's custom swimming pool in its advertising circulars). Section 43(a) refers to false designations only; it does not expressly limit its application to
registered trademarks.
47. Franklin Mint, Inc. v. Franklin Mint, Ltd., 331 F. Supp. 827, 830 (E.D.
Pa. 1971) ("Even if the defendant matches the high quality of plaintiff's
products . ..plaintiff is still entitled to have his reputation within his
control.").
48. See, e.g., Anne Klein Studio v. Hong Kong Quality Knitters, Ltd., 192
U.S.P.Q. 514 (D.N.J. 1976) (counterfeit T-shirts bearing plaintiff's trademark); Tefal, S.A. v. Products Int'l Co., 186 U.S.P.Q. 545 (D.N.J. 1975) (nonstick frying pans labeled TEPAL-WARE confusingly similar to pans labeled
T-FAL). Proof of intent to copy raises a rebuttable presumption of confusion. Fleishman Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149, 158, 136
U.S.P.Q. 508, 516 (9th Cir.) ("very act of the adopter has indicated that he
expects confusion and resultant profit"), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 830 (1963).
49. See, e.g., National Ass'n of Blue Shield Plans v. United Bankers Life
Ins. Co., 362 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1966) (defendant used a red shield to designate its line of hospital insurance; plaintiff used a blue shield).
50. See, e.g., Hancock v. American Steel & Wire Co., 203 F.2d 737, 97
U.S.P.Q. 330 (C.C.P.A. 1953) (competing brands of fencing called Tornado
and Cyclone).
51. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 175
U.S.P.Q. 56 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (plaintiff's distinctive lettering used on a poster
urging "Enjoy Cocaine").
52. See, e.g., Chemical Corp. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d 433 (5th
Cir. 1962) (plaintiff used "where there's life ... there's Bud"; defendant's
pesticide used slogan "where there's life . . .there's bugs"), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 965 (1963); Pure Foods, Inc. v. Minute Maid Corp., 214 F.2d 792 (5th
Cir. 1954) (Minute-Made v. Minute-Maid).

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 16:101

the casual observer, the mark infringes. It is no defense that the
defendant's mark appears on a kind of goods different from that
of the plaintiff if sponsorship can reasonably be inferred, 5 3 or
that the defendant's product is sold to a different segment of the
consumer market.M In some cases, a word, symbol, or design,
which ordinarily would not be a valid trademark, has developed,
through extensive and continuous use, such a close association
with the owner in the mind of the public that the mark has "become distinctive of the [trademark owner's] goods."5 5 The mark
is said to have acquired a secondary meaning and becomes a
protectable trademark.
The Lanham Act also provides remedies to owners of trademarks. Federal courts have original jurisdiction in all infringement actions 56 and may grant injunctions in all appropriate
cases. 57 Where the plaintiff can prove that the defendant intended to deceive or confuse, the court may award lost profits,
damages, and costs.5 8 The court may also order the seizure and
disposal of all articles which bear the infringing mark and all
means of reproducing the infringing mark.59 These remedies,
coupled with the powers of nationwide service and enforcement, 60 are usually sufficient to adequately protect the
trademark.
Parking-lot vendors of bootleg merchandise present a peculiar problem, however. Having tried the usual remedies of preliminary and permanent injunction and having found that they
were ineffective or unavailable, licensees and entertainers have
turned to unusual remedies. In an effort to make bootlegging
less attractive by drying up sales opportunities and decreasing
the pr6fitability of infringement, the performers now seek ex
parte temporary restraining orders.
53. See, e.g., The Villager, Inc. v. Dial Shoe Co., 256 F. Supp. 694, 702, 150
U.S.P.Q. 528, 534 (E.D. Pa. 1966) ("Infringement is present when the prod-

ucts are sufficiently related so that prospective purchasers would be likely
to believe that they emanate from a single source or that they are in some
way sponsored by a single source."); Carling Brewing Co. v. Philip Morris,
Inc., 277 F. Supp. 326, 156 U.S.P.Q. 330 (C.C.P.A. 1953) (brewer of Black Label beer sued to enjoin use of name on cigarettes).
54. See, e.g., Anne Klein Studio v. Hong Kong Quality Knitters, Ltd., 192

U.S.P.Q. 514 (D.N.J. 1976) (lower price may warn consumer that it is not
authentic Anne Klein goods, but it is just as likely that the consumer will
think that the article is a real bargain).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1976). See, e.g., Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell,
Inc., 632 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1980).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 1121 (1976).

57. 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (1976).
58. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1117 (1976).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 1118 (1976).
60. 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (1976).
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Ex PARTE

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

Under ordinary circumstances, plaintiffs know the names of
the offenders, and they may petition the court for a temporary
restraining order and notify the defendants of the action. Upon
a showing of irreparable harm and probable success on the merits, 6 1 the court issues the order. In special circumstances, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b) allows a court to issue an ex
parte temporary restraining order without notice to the adverse
party; 62 notice may be waived if immediate and irreparable
harm to the plaintiff will occur before the adverse party can be
heard, and the court is convinced that notice cannot, or should
63
not, be given.
Even ex parte restraining orders are ineffective against
bootleggers because, generally, the names of the infringers are
unknown to the plaintiffs. Consequently, performers have resorted to a special form of the ex parte order, the "John Doe"
temporary restraining order. In an ex parte proceeding, the
plaintiff licensee alleges that, "on information and belief, ' 64 unknown defendants will counterfeit plaintiff's marks and attempt
to market the merchandise bearing the counterfeit marks at the
concert site on a specified date. 65 The court may then issue a
temporary restraining order.
Rule 65(b) places stringent restrictions on the scope of an
ex parte order, limiting the order to a maximum duration of ten
days from the time of issue and requiring: 1) a hearing at the
earliest possible date; 2) the immediate filing of the order and
61. Tefal, S.A. v. Products Int'l Co., 186 U.S.P.Q. 545, 547-48 (D.N.J. 1975)
("In accordance with the general rule, a preliminary injunction will issue in

a trademark infringement action only upon a showing of irreparable injury
during the pendancy of the action, and the likelihood of ultimate success on

the part of the applicant.").

62. See, e.g., Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 439

(1974) ("Ex parte temporary restraining orders are no doubt necessary in
certain circumstances, [but] they should be restricted to serving their underlying purpose of preserving the status quo and preventing irreparable
harm just so long as is necessary to hold a hearing, and no longer.").
63. See, e.g., In re Vuitton et Fils S.A., 606 F.2d 1, 4-5 (2d Cir. 1979)
("Vuitton has demonstrated sufficiently why notice should not be required
in a case such as this one."); NEA Enterprises, Inc. v. Zack's, 209 U.S.P.Q.
566, 568 (S.D. Fla. 1980) ("plaintiff ... [has] demonstrated sufficiently to

the court why notice should not be required in a case such as this"). In
Vuitton, the circuit court took the appeal because of inconsistency among
the judges in the lower courts on the appropriateness of ex parte orders.
Vuitton, 606 F.2d 1, 3 n.5.
64. Complaint at 2, Moon Records v. Various Does, No. 81 C 907 (N.D. Ill.
1981).
65. Moon Records v. Various John Does, No. 81 C 907 (N.D. Ill.
1981) (ex
parte temporary restraining order granted for Chicago concert by the group
Rush).
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the reasons for its issue; and 3) the posting of bond by the plaintiff.66 In practice, the order is issued one to four days before the
concert, and a hearing is set for the opening hour of the court on
the first day court is in session after the concert. 67 A copy of the
order must be served on all offenders at the time of seizure 68 or
before seizure is effected, 69 and the name of the offender entered on the order as a defendant.7 0 All offenders are given notice of the time of the hearing. 7 1 Other common provisions
include limitations on the area which the order covers, 72 who
may actually enforce the order 73 and how it may be enforced, 74 a
66. FED. R. Cirv. P. 65(b) (1980).

67. See, e.g., Springsteen v. Creative Screen Design, Ltd., No. 80 C 5389,
slip op. at 16 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 23, 1981) (order issued 2 days before first of two
concerts); Winterland Concessions Co. v. Various John Does, No. C-1-80-618
(S.D. Ohio Nov. 18, 1980) (order issued Tuesday for Tuesday night concert,
court appearance at 10:00 a.m. Wednesday).
68. See, e.g., Nilon Bros., Inc. v. Various John Does, No. 65 (Phila. C.P.
July

-,

1981).

69. See, e.g., Winterland Concessions Co. v. Various John Does, No. C80-1064(W) (Dist. Ct. Okla. Sept. 6, 1980).
70. See, e.g., Seger v. Grand Illusion Design, Inc., No. 804-00213 (Cir. Ct.
Mo. May 23, 1980).
71. See, e.g., Winterland Concessions Co. v. Various John Does, No. C-180-618 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 18, 1980).
72. See, e.g. Winterland Concessions Co. v. Various John Does, No. C-180-618 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 18, 1980) (within a radius of one mile, in Ohio, of the
Coliseum); Winterland Concessions Co. v. Hensley, No. CA3-80-0414-G
(N.D. Tex. June 17, 1980) (on the Texas State Fair Grounds or within the
vicinity of the Fair Grounds, and on parking lots and traffic arteries serving
the Fair Grounds); Winterland Concessions Co. v. Various John Does, No.
13-7212 (Dist. Ct. Iowa May 23, 1980) (upon the Iowa State Fairgrounds or
campgrounds or within a one-half mile radius from said fairgrounds and
campgrounds); Winterland Concessions Co. v. Various John Does, No. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 18, 1981) (vicinity of Rich Stadium); Nilon Bros., Inc. v.
Various John Does, No. 65 (Phila. C.P. July -, 1981) (outside, inside, in the
environs of The Mann Music Center or anywhere within the City of
Philadelphia).
73. See, e.g., Winterland Concessions Co. v. Various John Does, No. C-180-618 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 18, 1980) (U.S. Marshall, sheriff, local police, specifically named police officer); Winterland Concessions Co. v. Various John
Does, No. 80 Civ. 5165 ADS (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 1980) (U.S. Marshall, local
police, licensed private investigator); Winterland Concessions Co. v. Hensley, No. CA3-80-0414-G (N.D. Tex. June 17, 1980) (U.S. Marshall, local police,
licensed private investigator); Winterland Concessions Co. v. Various John
Does, No. 13-7212 (Dist. Ct. Iowa May 23, 1980) (local law enforcement personnel, other persons over eighteen years of age selected by the plaintiff);
Winterland Concessions Co. v. Various John Does, No. 5216 (Phila. C.P. Oct.
2, 1980) (sheriff, local police, city licensing agency, private guard service).
74. See, e.g., Winterland Concessions Co. v. Various John Does, No. - at
4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 18, 1981) (private enforcers shall not carry weapons,
shall act in peaceful manner so that no injuries are sustained and shall not
pursue sellers in the event those sellers flee; any resistence by sellers will
be met solely by local and state police authorities).
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written receipt for seized merchandise,7 5 the disposition 77of any
76
merchandise which is seized, and expedited discovery.
Even with these restrictions, an ex parte order can be a potent weapon against bootleggers. Ex parte seizure orders are
particularly effective. Seizures can lead the plaintiff to other
bootleggers and silk-screen operations, especially if the seizure
order is drafted broadly enough to allow enforcement officers to
trace the crews back to their suppliers. 78 Some orders also allow
enforcement officers to seize any vehicles which were used to
transport infringing goods;79 seizure of a car or van is a much
more serious loss to a bootlegger than even a large quantity of Tshirts. While some bootleggers silk-screen their own T-shirts,
many others, especially those in smaller cities, buy T-shirts
from silk-screen operations in other parts of the country. 0 If
the goods can be and are seized while still in the shipping wrappers, labels and bills of lading may contain information which
will lead back to the shipper and enable the plaintiff to halt the
infringement at its source. 8 1
The proof necessary to make a restraining order appropriate
is not difficult to produce in T-shirt cases. The plaintiffs are
well-known, and there is no question that they have established
83
82
The harm is clearly irreparable,
the right to exclusive use.
75. See, e.g., Winterland Concessions Co. v. Various John Does, No. C80-1064(W) (Dist. Ct. Okla. Sept. 6, 1980) (written receipt given to person
from whom goods were seized, goods to be kept in bags identified with numbers tied to the receipts).
76. See, e.g., Winterland Concessions Co. v. Various John Does, No. H81166 (D. Conn. March 31, 1981) (distributed to Red Cross disaster relief, ten
held for evidence); Cincinnati Riverfront Coliseum v. Various John Does,
No. C-1-81-261 (S.D. Ohio March 13, 1981) (given to U.S. Marshall to distribute to welfare agencies in the district at his discretion); Winterland
Concessions Co. v. Various John Does, No. C-331181 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 4,
1980) (delivered up to plaintiffs for destruction or other disposition);
Winterland Concessions Co. v. Various John Does, No. 2274 (Phila. C.P.
Sept. 15, 1980) (given to plaintiffs for destruction or gift to charitable agency;
if to be destroyed, defendant to be given notice and opportunity to attend; if
given to charity, proof of delivery and acceptance to be filed with the court).
77. See, e.g., Winterland Concessions Co. v. Creative Screen Design,
Ltd., No. 80 C 5389 (N.D. IMI. Nov. 16, 1981) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
78. See, e.g., Winterland Concessions Co. v. Various John Does, No. 80

Civ. 5165 ADS (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 1980).

79. See, e.g., Winterland Concessions Co. v. Various John Does, No. 5216
(Phila. C.P. Oct. 2, 1980).
. 80. Winterland Concessions Co. v. Sileo, 528 F. Supp. 1201, 1208 (N.D. Ill.
f981).
81. Id. at 1211.
82. Id. at 1214.
83. "By depriving plaintiff of the ability to control the nature and quality
of defendant's goods, defendant inflicts serious harm upon plaintiff. This
deprivation, without more, constitutes irreparable injury." Franklin Mint,
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since a T-shirt, once sold, cannot be unsold. Also, damages are
not reasonably ascertainable.8 4 No one can accurately predict
how many shirts would have been sold by the licensee if the
bootleggers had not been present. Even if damages can be estimated by statistics from other concerts, bootleggers are very
careful not to keep records, 85 and apportionment and recovery
of damages are impractical. Also, bootleggers almost never challenge seizures, either at the site or by appearing in court. 86 The
profit margin is so great that they can afford to lose large numbers of shirts and still feel adequately compensated. 87 Since
fans are purchasing the counterfeit T-shirts, clearly there is not
only the likelihood of confusion, but actual confusion in the
minds of the public. The only possible defense is that the infringement was innocent and unintentional,8 8 but the evasive
Inc. v. Franklin Mint, Ltd., 331 F. Supp. 827, 830 (E.D. Pa. 1971). See also
NEA Enterprises, Inc. v. Zack's, 209 U.S.P.Q. 566, 568 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
84. "Even more serious is the probable damage to plaintiff's goodwill, an
intangible value which can never accurately be ascertained." Franklin
Mint, Inc. v. Franklin Mint, Ltd., 331 F. Supp. 827, 830 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
85. Winterland Concessions Co. v. Sileo, 528 F. Supp. 1201, 1209 (N.D. Ill.
1981). The defendant's records were coded to conceal which mark was sold.
Disbursements were made with checks payable to "cash." Lack of defendant records can sometimes be overcome partially by using records from defendant's suppliers. Id. See also Springsteen v. Creative Screen Design,
Ltd., No. 80 C 5389, slip op. at 14-15 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 23, 1981).
86. See, e.g., Cincinnati Riverfront Coliseum v. Various John Does, No.
C-1-81-261 (S.D. Ohio March 13, 1981); Winterland Concessions Co. v. Various John Does, No. 975 (Phila. C.P. Aug. 13, 1980).
87. Bootleg T-shirts are usually imported from Pakistan. They are untreated, lightweight, pure cotton and cost about $1.20 each in quantity.
When the cost of silk-screening is added, the total cost to the bootlegger is
less than two dollars. T-shirts are sold for five to seven dollars, leaving a
profit of three to five dollars per shirt. Winterland Concessions Co. v. Sileo,
528 F. Supp. 1201, 1208, 1210 (N.D. Ill. 1981); interview with Peter Wilkes, U.S.
Marshall for the Northern District of Illinois, in Chicago (Jan. 29, 1982). In a
New York case, there was testimony that the defendant had gross revenues
of between $60,000 and $75,000 from the sale of counterfeit Rolling Stones Tshirts at a single performance in Philadelphia. Musidor, B.V. v. Great
American Screen, 658 F.2d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 102 S.
Ct. 1440 (1982).
88. One bootlegger made a brave attempt at a novel defense. The Tshirts that he sold displayed the logo of Blue Oyster Cult on the front and
the logo of Foghat on the back. Also displayed on the shirts were a calendar
of upcoming events, a telephone number for a drug crisis center, a "space
available" sign, an advertisement for a local radio station, some self-promotion, and a copyright notice. He claimed that his T-shirts were really newspapers and were protected from seizure by the first amendment. The judge
ruled that his "newspapers" were bootleg T-shirts, and quoting Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir.
1979), noted that the first amendment "is not a license to trammel on legally
recognized rights in intellectual property." Winterland Concessions Co. v.
Sileo, 528 F. Supp. 1201, 1214 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
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tactics of vendors belie this argument. 89 Further, many of the
names used by performers as trademarks are nonsense words 9o
or common words used in nonsense or unconventional combinations. 91 It is irrational to believe that an infringer would independently create the same name and design, and then, by
coincidence, try to sell T-shirts bearing that design at a concert
given by the user of an identical and widely-known mark.
In some respects, ex parte orders are a necessity for the
plaintiff in infringement suits. Some infringement is done innocently, and the offender ceases voluntarily when asked to do so.
Most infringement, however, is intentional, 92 and the infringer
will not surrender his easy profits without a fight. The notice
which accompanies non-ex parte orders works to the advantage
of the bootlegger; goods may be hidden, moved to a site not covered by the order, or transferred into the possession of a nonparty.93 Notice is particularly advantageous to the parking-lot
vendor, who, forewarned that seizure is likely at a given concert,
stays away. 94 The vendor will not sell any T-shirts at that concert, but neither will he lose any to seizure by enforcement officers. The licensee has recovered any sales he might have lost
to the bootleggers, but also has made no progress toward abating the problem.
The larger problem in dealing with parking-lot T-shirts is
that the defendants are "unknown, and not capable of being
known. ' 95 Even though some vendors are known to the plaintiffs or enforcement officers by face, if not by name,96 the plain89. One printer kept the location of his printing facilities secret even
from his customers. He testified that his purpose was to frustrate enforcement efforts by the trademark owners. Winterland Concessions Co. v.
Sileo, 528 F. Supp. 1201, 1210 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
90. E.g., Foghat, REO Speedwagon, Pink Floyd.

91. E.g., Grateful Dead, Blue Oyster Cult, Electric Light Orchestra, Led
Zeppelin, Moody Blues.
92. Springsteen v. Creative Screen Design, Ltd., No. 80 C 5389, slip op. at
13-14 (N.D. IlM. Oct. 23, 1981).
93. Musidor, B.V. v. Great American Screen, 658 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1981)

(silk-screening equipment hidden in basement), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 102
S. Ct. 1440 (1982); In re Vuitton et Fils. S.A., 606 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1979) (luggage transferred to other counterfeiters); NEA Enterprises, Inc. v. Zack's,
209 U.S.P.Q. 566 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (solvent transferred to third parties).
94. Bootleg silk-screen artists frequently appear at the office of the U.S.
Marshall on the afternoon of a concert, still wearing stained clothing and
with paint still on their hands, to inquire if "you guys are going to be out
there tonight." Interview with Peter Wilkes, U.S. Marshall for the Northern
District of Illinois, in Chicago (Jan. 29, 1982).
95. Winterland Concessions Co. v. Hensley, No. CA3-80-0414-G (N.D.
Tex. June 17, 1980); Winterland Concessions Co. v. Various John Does, No.
- (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 14, 1981).
96. Enforcement officers and vendors are familiar to each other at least
by face. Vendors have been known to sight a deputy marshall and then
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tiff cannot predict which of the known vendors will attempt to
sell T-shirts at a given concert. If the concert is by a nationallyknown group, the problem is complicated by the presence of
itinerant out-of-town vendors who follow the group from town to
town and may be completely unknown to the plaintiffs. 97 If the
plaintiff requests the order and names all known vendors as defendants, but many of them do not appear on the night of the
concert, courts may feel that the plaintiff is "fishing" and abusing the authority of the court.98 The court may be less willing to
grant an injunction in the future.
Another aspect of the problem is that local vendors, feeling
that the marshalls are too familiar with their faces, frequently
"run a crew," hiring others, usually teenagers, to do the actual
selling.99 Each crew member carries only a few shirts; the bootlegger remains in his vehicle with hundreds of shirts, safe from
seizure because most orders require that shirts must literally be
"held out for sale" before they can be seized. 10 0 If a crew member is stopped, only the few shirts that he has with him are forfeited; the main supply is safe. Finally, whether local or
itinerant, vendors are consistent in giving false names and addresses when confronted. 01' Further efforts to obtain a preliminary or permanent injunction are fruitless. Even if the
injunction issues, it is unenforceable unless the plaintiff can
prove that the offender and the person named in the order are
the same. If the injunction was granted against "various John
Does," the plaintiff must prove that that particular offender had
been given notice and the opportunity for a hearing. Since infringement is a civil offense, 10 2 identities given by vendors when
the temporary restraining order is served cannot be verified
through means which would be available in a criminal action,
quietly depart without attempting to sell any merchandise. Interview with
Peter Wilkes, U.S. Marshall for the Northern District of Illinois, in Chicago
(Jan. 29, 1982).
97. Winterland Concessions Co. v. Sileo, 528 F. Supp. 1201, 1209 (N.D. Ill.
1981); Rock Tours, Ltd. v. Various John Does, 507 F. Supp. 63, 66 (N.D. Ala.
1981).

98. Interview with Michael Roche, Hubachek & Kelly, Chicago, Illinois
(March 4, 1982).
99. Winterland Concessions Co. v. Sileo, 528 F. Supp. 1201, 1211 (N.D. Ill.
1981); interview with Peter Wilkes, U.S. Marshall for the Northern District

of Illinois, in Chicago (Jan. 29, 1982).
100. Moon Records, Inc. v. Various John Does, No. 81 C 907 (N.D. Ill. Feb.
26, 1981).
101. Two vendors are known to Chicago area enforcement officers only as
"Red" and "Moose"; their real names or even their full names have never
been discovered. Interviews with Peter Wilkes, U.S. Marshall for the Northern District of Illinois, in Chicago (Jan. 29, 1982), and
Hubachek & Kelly, Chicago, Illinois (March 4, 1982).

102. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1976).

with Michael Roche,
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e.g., fingerprinting and mug shots. 10 3 Proof that the offender and
the named party are the same becomes a case of "your word
against mine." Once again, the plaintiff faces a situation of
either obtaining an ex parte temporary restraining order or having no legal remedy at all.
JUDICIAL RESPONSE

Judges are justifiably reluctant to issue ex parte orders.
Even if Rule 65(b) is followed exactly, there is still some interference with the defendant's right to due process. While there is
no right to a hearing before a temporary restraining order issues, judges are still concerned with lack of notice. The timing
of notice and hearing are flexible standards, however, and in
emergencies either or both can be delayed. 10 4 In T-shirt cases,
both notice and hearing are given at the earliest possible time.
Notice is given when the defendants finally become known, and
a hearing is held at the earliest scheduled court session. Such
slight delay is unlikely to prejudice the defendant, and significantly lessens the harm to the plaintiff.
Another concern of judges is the possibility of abuse of the
ex parte order by the plaintiff. Posting of bond partially alleviates this fear, 10 5 and the history of the validity of complaints by
plaintiffs further eases this concern. 10 6 An additional factor
which disposes judges to rule in favor of the plaintiff is that
bootleggers almost never make an appearance at court;10 7 they
simply take their losses and think up a new phony name. Be103. The copyright statute already provides for criminal suits. 17 U.S.C.

§506 (1976).
104. See, e.g., Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950)
(seizure of misbranded articles under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act without prior notice to defendant); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245
(1947) (assets of savings and loan association seized without notice to owners); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944) (ex parte temporary restraining order to enjoin implementation of rent controls).
105. Bonds vary widely and may or may not include fees for services of
enforcement officers. Winterland Concessions Co. v. Various John Does,
No. C-1-80-618 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 18, 1980) ($500 and marshall's fees); Winterland Concessions Co. v. Hensley, No. CA3-80-0414-G (N.D. Tex. June 17,
1980) ($30,000 and marshall's fees); Winterland Concessions Co. v. An Unknown Manufacturing Company, No. 80-760-CIV-EPS (S.D. Fla. March 28,

1980) ($10,000); Nilon Bros., Inc. v. Various John Does, No. 65 (Phila. C.P.
July-, 1981) ($3500).
106. One frequent plaintiff, Winterland Concessions, has seized merchandise on every occasion for which it received an ex parte temporary restraining order from the Northern District of Illinois. Interview with
Michael Roche, Hubachek & Kelly, Chicago, Illinois (March 4, 1982).
107. See, e.g., Cincinnati Riverfront Coliseum, Inc. v. Various John Does,
No. C-1-81-261 (S.D. Ohio March 13, 1981); Winterland Concessions Co. v.
Various John Does, No. C-331181 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 4, 1980); Winterland
Concessions Co. v. Various John Does, No. 2274 (Phila. C.P. Sept. 15, 1980).
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sides indicating a lack of concern for their own due process
rights, the defendants' failure to appear makes further action by
the plaintiff difficult. The plaintiff gets an ex parte order or
nothing. When judges rule on the propriety of an injunction, 10 8
they consider the interests of both the plaintiff and the defendants, the relative injury to each, and the possibility of error.
Most judges find great harm to the plaintiff and minimal harm to
the defendants and issue the restraining order. In the past two
years, courts in at least eighteen jurisdictions, 10 9 comprising
both state and federal courts, have issued ex parte restraining
orders. Recognizing that the property rights of the performers
are being violated and that ordinary remedies do not give relief,
one court noted:
[w) ere the injunction to be denied, plaintiffs would be without any
legal means to prevent what is clearly a blatant infringement of
their valid property rights. While the proposed remedy is novel,
that in itself should not weigh against its adoption by this court. A
court of equity is free to fashion whatever remedies will adequately
protect the rights of the parties before it. 110

Very few courts have denied injunctive relief, but those few
have had some unusual rationalizations."' The rock group Styx
was denied an injunction when the judge ruled that he had no in
personam jurisdiction over the alleged offenders; the itinerant
112
vendors did not have sufficient connections with the locality.
This is a blatant distortion of the doctrines of International
Shoe 113 and World-Wide Volkswagen." 4 Even the shortest of
108. The standard is irreparable harm to plaintiff before there is time for
defendant to be heard and probable success by the plaintiff on the merits.
Winterland Concessions Co. v. Hensley, No. CA3-80-0414-G (N.D. Tex. June
17, 1980); Winterland Concessions Co. v. Various John Does, No. - (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Sept. 18, 1981); Winterland Concessions Co. v. Various John Does,
No. 5216 (Phila. C.P. Oct. 2, 1980).
109. California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Wisconsin.
110. Joel v. Various John Does, 499 F. Supp. 791, 792 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
111. A judge in the Southern District of New York informed plaintiff
Vuitton et Fils S.A. that he would consider any further requests for ex parte
temporary restraining orders "vexatious." As a result, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stepped in and issued a writ of
mandamus directing him to grant the request and noted the recalcitrant
judge by name in the opinion. In re Vuitton et Fils S.A., 606 F.2d 1, 3 n.5
(1979).
112. Rock Tours, Ltd. v. Various John Does, 507 F. Supp. 63, 66 (N.D. Ala.
1981).
113. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). International Shoe resisted Washington's attempts to collect employment taxes.
Salesmen in Washington forwarded orders to the defendant, but the defendant did not maintain any retail outlets in the state. The Supreme Court
held that a long-standing mail-order business was sufficient to subject International Shoe to the jurisdiction of Washington courts.
114. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). A
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long-arm statutes allows jurisdiction when the nonresident commits a tort while within the jurisdiction. In any event, the Lanham Act specifically allows for nationwide service and
11 5
enforcement.
A second argument against the order was that since the proceeding had been completely ex parte, the request was not justiciable." 6 Citing Flast v. Cohen," 7 the judge contended that
federal courts may take jurisdiction only when there is a "case
or controversy." Since there were "no adversaries in this
Court" 118 (i.e., no named defendants), there was no controversy
and therefore no jurisdiction. This argument is clearly specious.
If lack of an in-court defendant were fatal, all ex parte proceedings would be either illegal or a legal myth; the procedure would
be a meaningless addition to the federal rules. It is unlikely that
ex parte proceedings would be included in the federal rules if it
was never intended that they should be used.
Finally, the judge turned the unlikelihood of further litigation against the plaintiff. One of the requirements for a temporary restraining order is probable success on the merits. Since
there would probably be no litigation on the merits, there could
be no probable success on the merits, and therefore no injunction would issue." 19
Such blatant hostility toward intellectual property 20 is fortunately rare, but more subtle hostility and ignorance is not. Intellectual property is protected by both state and federal
statutes, but many orders and opinions make one wonder
whether the court read the current version of the applicable law
New York resident who purchased a car from a New York dealer had an
accident in Oklahoma and sued the New York dealer there. The Supreme
Court held that jurisdiction did not exist unless the defendant's activities
produced a reasonable expectation of being sued in that forum.

115. 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (1976).
116. Rock Tours, Ltd. v. Various John Does, 507 F. Supp. 63, 65 (N.D. Ala.
1981). A judge in Illinois used the same reasoning in conditioning a tempo-

rary restraining order. Winterland Concessions Co. v. Geisel, 511 F. Supp.
310, 311 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
117. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
118. Rock Tours Ltd. v. Various John Does, 507 F. Supp. 63, 66 (N.D. Ala.
1981). The judge may have been confused by decisions such as Fifty Assoc.
v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 446 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1970), which said that the
practice of using "John Doe" defendants had no place in federal courts. The
problem there, however, was not that there were defendants whose names

were unknown, but that the "John Doe" defendants were ficticious. Id. at
1191.
119. Rock Tours, Ltd. v. Various John Does, 507 F. Supp. 63, 66 (N.D. Ala.
1981).
120. Intellectual property encompasses patent, copyright, and
trademark.
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or even an outdated version. 12 1 It is well-known among patent
attorneys that plaintiffs in an infringement suit should avoid
some federal jurisdictions at all costs, 1 22 because some judges
harbor animosity toward the "monopoly"' 2 3 granted to intellectual property and rule accordingly. 124 The Supreme Court has
for many years refused to hear trademark cases,1 25 and so has
given the lower courts no precedents to follow and no mandate
126
to enforce the present laws.
121. Rock Tours v. Various John Does, 507 F. Supp. 63, 66 n.6 (N.D. Ala.
1981). In a side issue, the judge noted that there was some doubt as to the
validity of the plaintiffs copyright claim, and citing a case from 1896, declared that the plaintiff had no copyright. The current version of the Copyright Act (1976) abolishes common-law copyright and grants protection to
all writings of an author, published and unpublished, registered and unregistered. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1976).
122. In one instance, a sitting judge recognized a tendency by his colleagues to invalidate patents.
It would not be difficult to cite many instances of patents that have
been granted, improperly I think, and without adequate tests of invention by the Patent Office. But I doubt that the remedy for such Patent
Office passion for granting patents is an equally strong passion in this
Court for striking them down so that the only patent that is valid is one
which this Court has not been able to get its hands on.
Jungersen v. Ostby &Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
A survey of federal trademark infringemark suits reported in the
United States Patent Quarterly between January, 1953, and June, 1979, revealed that the jurisdiction in which the motion is brought may affect
whether the request is granted.
With such lack of uniformity in the circuits, the movant should never be
faulted when he avoids district courts in those circuits, such as the First
(38% granted) and the Sixth (44% granted), where the total percent of
preliminary injunctions granted remains relatively low. On the other
hand, the movant who seeks relief in the Fifth Circuit or the Ninth Circuit will find overall allowance rates of 89% and 59% respectively. Additionally, in the Fifth Circuit, only 6% of the district court cases were
appealed, of which 100% were affirmed.
Dorr &Duft, Trademark PreliminaryInjunctive Relief, 62 J. PAT. OrF. Soc'Y
3,10-11 (1980).
123. "The trademark is seen by some as monopolistic only because of the
great value of some marks, great value created by the hard work of the owner of the mark and his investment of time and money. There is no monopoly in the product." Lunsford & Cohrs, Trademark Protection: Judicial
Inconsistency in the Fifth Circuit, 32 MERCER L. REV. 1167, 1195 (1981).

124. "The right granted to the owner of a registered trademark is a monopoly and should not be extended unless the owner is clearly entitled
thereto." S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Johnson, 266 F.2d 129, 136 (6th Cir.
1959). See also Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980).

125. The Court recently decided Darby Drug Co. v. Ives Labs., - U.S. -,
102 S. Ct. 2182 (1982). The next most recent time the Supreme Court considered substantive trademark issues was in Mishawaka Mfg. Co. v. Kresge
Co., 316 U.S. 203 (1942).
126. Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 580 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1978)
(although the junior user was clearly infringing on the senior user's mark,
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ALTERNATIVES TO

Ex PARTE ORDERS

The most effective weapon that trademark owners may
presently use against infringers is discovery. The defendant can
be required to produce all goods which infringe upon the plaintiff's marks and all means of reproducing the marks. 127 While
seizing the means of production does not stop the infringement,
it at least inhibits it. The problem is still identity. Discovery is
aimed at a particular individual and search warrants at a particular address. If names and addresses are unknown, discovery is
not available.
A less effective alternative is municipal anti-peddling ordinances. A number of cities have such laws, 28 but often they are
enforced inconsistently. 129 Even if the laws are enforced, the offense is usually a misdemeanor. Such ordinances do not deter
bootleggers to any significant degree and are not an adequate
alternative, since the performers often work in cities which do
not have such laws. Even if city ordinances exist and are rigorously enforced, they should not be construed to negate the
plaintiff's right and need to bring suit for trademark
30
infringement.
In desperation, the performers could attempt to convince
their fans not to buy souvenirs except inside the concert hall
from official vendors. Warnings could be printed on all advertising materials and tickets and included in all broadcast advertising. Realistically, most people neither read tickets beyond date
and seat number, nor do they assimilate advertising beyond
date and where to buy tickets. Printed warnings are unlikely to
succeed to any great extent.
The solution lies in both educating the judiciary and public
on the purpose of trademarks and the harm done by counterfeiting, and amending existing laws, allowing for more rigorous enforcement and stiffer penalties. The motive for infringement is
money; when infringement becomes unprofitable, it will cease.
the court "balanced the equities," including the greater financial success of
the junior user, and denied relief), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979).
127. Winterland Concessions Co. v. Creative Screen Design, Ltd., 210
U.S.P.Q. 6, 7 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (defendant required to produce business
records, infringing goods, and means of producing them).
128. See, e.g., § 12-14-4 Birmingham City Code (Ord. No. 77-109); Municipal Code of Chicago ch. 141 (1980).
129. Interview with Peter Wilkes, U.S. Marshall for the Northern District
of Illinois, in Chicago (Jan. 29, 1982).
130. Rock Tours, Ltd. v. Various John Does, 507 F. Supp. 63, 65 (N.D. Ala.
1981) (judge used existence of such an ordinance as a rationalization for
denying the order).
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Both judges and the public need a greater awareness of how
trademarks enable them to live as they do. While there are
those who will buy anything if it is cheap enough, most consumers search for goods which offer them acceptable quality at a
reasonable price. Low-priced generic products are repurchased
only if the price is accompanied by acceptable quality. Unacceptable quality sends consumers back to goods which have
been satisfactory in the past. Consciously or unconsciously,
131
consumers depend on trademarks to identify those goods.
Ironically, trademark infringement itself may help halt infringement. As counterfeiting becomes more widespread, more
and more people are likely to be directly affected. It is no longer
a case of buying under conditions which should make the buyer
suspicious of the goods. The trademarks for designer jeans,
Cartier watches, Vera scarves, and TDK recording tapes have all
been copied recently, and the falsely labeled goods have been
sold in the most respectable stores. 13 2 Such incidents demonstrate that infringement is detrimental not only to the trademark owner, but to the public as well, 13 3 and the public and
courts will become more receptive to strict enforcement of
trademark rights.
The best hope for trademark owners is new or amended legislation. Major clothes manufacturers have already had some
success in this area. 3 4 Most useful would be an amendment to
the Lanham Act which would require offenders to prove their
identities at the time of service of process and would provide
civil or criminal penalties for giving false information. False
names are the chief stumbling block to effective abatement of
infringement. Once the plaintiff obtains a defendant's true
name, the usual methods of enforcement become available and
effective.
Another beneficial change would be a clear specification
that a plaintiff may both trace the crew members back to the
131. Diamond, The Public Interest and the Trademark System, 62 J.
Soc'Y 528, 544-45 (1980).
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132. The most exclusive store in Tokyo was embarrassed to discover that
it had sold a counterfeit designer tie to the Emperor. Conlon, Commercial
Counterfeiting: An Overview, 1 PRAC. APPR. PAT. TRADEMARKS &COPYRIGHT
273, 276 (1980).
133. "Such a [purchaser] would be indeed irreparably injured and could

never be recompensed at all. Indeed, it is the misfortune of those kinds of
cases that we would never be able to ascertain who they were." Anne Klein
Studio v. Hong Kong Quality Knitters, Ltd., 192 U.S.P.Q. 514, 517 (D.N.J.

1976).
134. Most of the counterfeit goods in that area are imported, so the manufacturers lobbied for mandatory seizure by customs of infringing goods.
Congress passed such a law in 1978. Customs Procedural Reform and Simplification Act of 1978, Public Law 95-410, 92 Stat. 888.
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main supply and seize any goods discovered, along with the vehicles used to transport them. 135 Such legislation would also
help if the vendors receive their T-shirts from printers who operate in other areas of the country. Shutting down a bootlegger
who ships T-shirts all over the country goes a long way toward
abating the infringement.
CONCLUSION

There are always those who choose to usurp the work of
others for their own benefit, preferably the most benefit for the
least effort. Trademarks and service marks 136 are most valuable
when they are widely recognized; the better known the mark,
137
the more likely it becomes that the mark will be infringed.
Trademarks and service marks of celebrities are prime targets.
Some would argue that such infringement is harmless; performers already have more money than they can possibly use
and are greedy to want more. Why not let others share the pie?
This attitude conveniently ignores that infringers are motivated
completely by greed and completely unmotivated by any mitigating desire to protect reputation, 138 and that the licensees also
suffer losses because of the infringement. It also misses the purpose of protecting trademarks. Preservation of the owner's income is secondary to the public's interest in preserving
competition in the marketplace. 139 Trademarks allow consumers to separate goods which have satisfied their needs in the
past from those which have been found to be inferior. If everything came in plain brown wrappers, consumers would have no
way to identify and repurchase satisfactory goods or to avoid unsatisfactory articles. Inability to profit from producing highquality trademarked goods reduces the manufacturer's incentive to maintain quality, and consumers might be faced with in40
dustry-wide mediocrity and loss of choice.'
Trademarks are essential to the marketplace as it exists today. No matter what the product and its quality or utility, pro135. The copyright law already includes such a provision. 17 U.S.C. § 509
(1976).

136. "The term 'service mark' means a mark used in the sale or advertising of services to identify the services of one person and distinguish them

from the services of others." 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1976).
137. Conlon, Commercial Product Counterfeiting: An Overview, 1 PHAc.
273, 273 (1980).

APPR. PAT. TRADEMARKS & COPYRIGHT

138. Diamond, The Public Interest and the Trademark System, 62 J. PAT.
OFF.

Soc'Y 528, 534-35 (1980).

139. "The consuming public is an unnamed third party in every action for
trademark infringement .... The law defines the infringement of a trademark in terms of its impact on the public." Id. at 529.
140. Id. at 544.
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tection of its trademark is necessary; one cannot choose to
protect some trademarks and not others without endangering all
trademarks. Performers have valid trademarks which deserve
protection. As the Supreme Court noted, "[n] o social purpose is
served by having the defendant get free some aspects of the
plaintiff that would have market value and for which he would
normally pay. ' 141 The comment was made in connection with
the right of publicity, but it applies equally well to trademarks.
While ex parte temporary restraining orders are a novel remedy, they are within the authority and discretion of the courts
and are, at present, the best protection performers have against
infringement. With them, performers have at least a stop-gap
method of defending their property rights. Without them, the
performers are defenseless.
Cheryl Johnson

Author's Note
After completing this comment, I had the opportunity to interview a former vendor of parking-lot T-shirts. In the summer
of 1979, when he was 18 years old, Johnny was asked by a friend,
Jim, if he wanted to sell T-shirts at concerts around the country
and "make lots of money." Jim's father-in-law had a friend,
George, who was looking for vendors. Johnny and Jim met with
George at the Palatine home of George's mother, and agreed to
meet the rest of the crew in Dallas for the Texas Jam, featuring
several nationally-known rock groups. George provided airplane tickets to Dallas, where Johnny and Jim were to meet
George's partner, Cherokee. Once on the road, vendors paid
their own expenses from profits on T-shirts. Vendors were given
T-shirts on consignment; anything over three dollars per shirt
was profit. Before leaving for Dallas, George took Johnny and
Jim to his supplier, a factory in Elk Grove, Illinois, and showed
them how the T-shirts were printed. Johnny said that this factory is now out of business.
George flew with them to Dallas as crew boss; Cherokee
drove the van and trailer from another concert in New Orleans.
The Dallas concert was at a large outdoor arena. Selling in the
141. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576
(1976) (quoting Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law--Were Warren and Brandeis
Wrong?, 31 LAw & CoTrrEMP. PROB. 326, 331 (1966)).
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parking lot was legal with a permit, but George did not get a permit, so the vendors had to dodge the police. George guaranteed
bail, but the vendors had no way to contact him, so the "guarantee" was, in effect, worthless. Knowing this, the vendors were
very careful to avoid arrest. Vendors were told to sell shirts
"any way you can": start your pitch while they're still in their
cars, cut prices, tell men "buy your girlfriend a shirt," if you
don't have the right size, rip off the tag and sell it.
After the Dallas concert, the crew of ten men packed into
the van for the trip to Phoenix for the Ted Nugent concert. One
huge box of T-shirts was flown to Phoenix from Chicago. They
picked up the shirts in Phoenix, but arrived too late for the concert. The box went into the U-haul trailer with the rest of the
shirts, and the crew headed toward Los Angeles for the Who
concert. George called Chicago and ordered shirts to be mailed
ahead.
Ten men in an air-conditioned van with uncovered asbestos
insulation attempted to cross the Arizona desert. A tire went
flat; the spare didn't fit. Nine men waited 10 hours in the sun
while Cherokee went for help. The tire was fixed; the transmission failed. Ten men were stranded for 3 days.
The crew arrived in Los Angeles the night before the concert. They found a hotel in Hermosa Beach, and all ten stayed in
2 rooms. The next night at the Forum, there were so many vendors, both with and without permits, that it was impossible to
make any money. There were police all over, so Johnny and another vendor hid their T-shirts in the bushes. The police found
the shirts and warned Johnny about selling without a permit,
but did not arrest him. Johnny told the police the location of the
van, but George had moved it.
Johnny and Jim gave up trying to sell T-shirts and sneaked
into the concert, just as they had done in Dallas. Johnny described hearing the concert as the best part of the whole experience. After the concert, a mugger assaulted Jim and took his Tshirts. When Johnny got back to the van, he had a fight with
George; they rolled about in the van, punching and kicking each
other. George dumped Johnny at Los Angeles Airport that night
with exactly enough money for a cut-rate one-way fare to Chicago. Johnny waited 8 hours for the next flight to Chicago and
slept in the airport.
Johnny remembers the experience as a bad dream. He
never made any money and had to cope with customers who
hassled him about price. The van was cramped and hot; eating
and sleeping were irregular. George, who was rich from dealing
in drugs, was a cocaine addict. Most of the crew were broke, but
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they soon discovered that if they approached George when he
was high, which was almost all the time, they could borrow
twenty or thirty dollars from him and not have to pay it back; he
never remembered "lending" the money.
Like the police, Johnny does not know the last names of
George or Cherokee, or where they live. He only knows that
George and another friend, Butch, hung out at a bar called Discovision, and that George's mother lived in Palatine.
Johnny knew that the T-shirts were of inferior quality; he
made the mistake of washing one. The paint chipped off and the
shirt became very wide and very short. He did not seem to realize that selling the shirts was illegal for any reason other than
not having a vending permit. He substantiated Winterland's assertion that at least as many T-shirts are sold outside the arena
as inside; in fact, he felt that many more shirts were sold outside
than inside.
Finally, he believed that the only effective deterrent is police enforcement. The arena in Dallas had a large parking lot,
but police patrolled only the perimeter. Once inside the circle of
policemen, one had to avoid only a few rather obvious plainclothes officers. Selling was easy. In Los Angeles, however, police were everywhere in the parking lot and on the surrounding
streets. Big badges identified licensed vendors and allowed police to distinguish illegal vendors quickly.
Everything Johnny told me supports the view of the plaintiffs that "John Doe" temporary restraining orders are the most
effective weapon against trademark pirates. Only the fear of losing large amounts of merchandise is an effective deterrent and
the only way for plaintiffs to engender that fear is a "John Doe"
order.

